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Case No. 20020304 -CA 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The plain language of Utah's escape statute requires that an inmate leave the 
confines of the state prison in order to commit a completed escape. Case law from other 
jurisdictions that define escape in a different way does not aid in analyzing Utah's 
statute. Moreover, some of the cases from other jurisdictions require, or at least suggest, 
that the defendant must be at liberty, even if only for a brief period of time, before a 
completed escape can be committed. This supports Germonto's position since he never 
was at liberty. 
The escape statute must be interpreted, if possible, to avoid interpretations that 
conflict with constitutional protections. Interpreting the escape statute so that a 
defendant can be convicted of a completed escape even though he has not left the 
confines of the prison renders the statute void for vagueness. The statute therefore 
cannot be interpreted in this fashion. 
I 
Moreover, Germonto has standing to assert this vagueness challenge. The state 
misconstrues the test when it argues that one must be completely innocent of criminal 
wrongdoing in order to have standing to assert a vagueness challenge. The correct test 
for standing is whether the defendant is adversely affected. In this case, Germonto is 
adversely affected since he was convicted of a completed escape even though he did not 
leave the confines of the prison. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LANGUAGE OF UTAH'S ESCAPE STATUTE REQUIRES A 
TOTAL DEPARTURE FROM PRISON CONFINEMENT IN ORDER 
TO CONSTITUTE ESCAPE. 
As set forth in Appellant's opening brief ("A.B.") at 6-16, the plain language of 
Utah's escape statute requires a total departure from prison confinement in order to be 
guilty of an escape. This is so because the statute defines escape as "leav[ing] official 
custody without lawful authorization." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(1 )(a) (2002). 
"Official custody" is defined as "confinement in a state prison." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
309(7)(b). And "confinement" means "housed in a state prison." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
8-309(7)(a)(i). 
Had the Legislature intended that any movement into restricted areas of the prison 
would give rise to an escape charge, its inclusion of the definitions for official custody 
and confinement would be unnecessary. The Legislature could have simply defined 
escape as leaving custody, or better yet, as moving into restricted areas without 
2 
authorization had the Legislature intended that the crime of escape be given such a broad 
sweep that it encompassed actions such as those in this case. Instead, the Legislature 
included a precise and specific definition that requires that an inmate leave official 
custody and defines such official custody as being confined or housed in a state prison. 
The state's argument that an inmate need not leave the confines of the prison in order to 
escape official custody is not well taken in light of the plain language of the statute, 
including this precise definition of the term "official custody." 
In analyzing the statutory terms "housed" and "confinement," the state disregards 
the context in which those terms appear. See state's brief ("S.B.") at 6-7. For example, 
the term "confinement" does not stand alone. Instead, the statute defines "official 
custody" as "confinement in a state prison." While standing alone, the term confinement 
might arguably refer to an inmate's cell or places where the inmate is authorized to be, 
the inclusion of the words "in a state prison" shows that the Legislature was referring to 
the state of being confined in the state prison and not to confinement in one's cell. 
The state's analysis of the term "housed" is similarly flawed since the state ignores 
the fact that the statute defines "confinement" as being "housed in a state prison ." The 
inclusion of the words "in a state prison" demonstrates that the Legislature defined 
confinement as the state of being held in prison and was not referring to the inmate's 
"living quarters, his lodgings, his 'housing in the prison'" as the state argues. See S.B. 
at 6. Indeed, the state twists the language of the statute when it changes the verb 
3 
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"housed" as used in the statute to refer to "housed in a state prison" into a noun, claiming 
that the language refers to an inmate's "housing." See. S.B. at 6. A complete reading of ' 
the statute clarifies that the Legislature made an effort to include definitions that would 
refine and clarify the meaning of "official custody" so that that term was properly utilized 
to refer to the state of being held in prison confines and to define the crime of escape as 
leaving those confines. 
The state acknowledges that decisions from other states provide little guidance 
since the language of statutes in other states is different from the language of the Utah 
statute and the facts of cases from other states vary. S.B. at 8. For example, the state 
relies must heavily on Scott v. State, 672 S.W.2d 465, 465-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 
S.B. at 7-8, 9. But the statute at issue in that case did not define the term "confinement." 
Id. at 466. Rather than relying on a statutory definition, as is required in this case, the 
Texas court of appeals looked at the dictionary definition for confinement and the facts 
of the case, and concluded that "[t]he walls of the jail building itself were the bounds of 
appellant's detention and custody," and appellant left confinement when he dug a hole 
out of the jail. Id. Because the statutory language and facts in Scott are very different 
from the present case, Scott provides no guidance in interpreting Utah's escape statute. 
Huffman v. State. 659 N.E.2d 214, 215 (Ind. App. 1995), also relied on by the 
state in support of its argument that Germonto was not required to leave prison 
boundaries in order to be guilty of an escape, likewise interprets language very different 
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from the language in Utah's statute. The Indiana statute at issue in Huffman defines 
escape as "intentionally flee[ing] from lawful detention . . . .,f IJL (citing Ind. Code 35-
44-3-5(a)). The Court concluded that a juvenile who left his cottage at the Indiana Boys' 
School "by breaking a lock off of a door, forcing open a second door, and removing a 
board covering a window" (Id.) fled from lawful detention and therefore was guilty of 
escape. Because the language of Indiana's statute is very different and defines escape as 
fleeing from lawful detention, Huffman provides no guidance. 
State v. Cahilh 194 N.W. 191, 192 (Iowa 1923), also relied on by the state in S.B. 
at 8-9, likewise provides no guidance because the statute at issue in that case explicitly 
states that an escape occurs when an inmate "leave[s] without due authority . . . any place 
whatsoever in which he is placed or to which he is directed to go " kL The Cahill 
court held that an inmate who escaped from his cell after being placed in solitary 
confinement and who was apprehended on the top of a perimeter wall was guilty of 
escape. This holding was consistent with the language of the Iowa statute making it an 
escape for an inmate to leave the cell in which he had been placed. IJL Since Utah's 
statute does not have similar language, Cahill is not persuasive. 
Cope v. Commonwealth. 645 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1983), cited in S.B. at 9, is easily 
distinguishable on its facts because the inmate in that case was essentially at liberty when 
arrested. In Cope, the inmate had reached a location where there were no locked doors 
between himself and the street. Id, at 704. He had sawed himself out of his cell and 
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gotten past the locked steel door by assaulting the guard. Id. Because the inmate had 
made it past the area used for confinement and was in an area that was not fenced or 
locked, the court concluded that he had departed from the detention facility and 
completed an escape. IcL Unlike the defendant in Cope, Germonto was never at liberty. 
Urbauerv. State, 744 P.2d 1274, 1275-76 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), cited by the 
state on page 9 of its brief, also involves distinct facts from the present case. In that case, 
the inmate had climbed over two fences and was apprehended as he was climbing the 
third and last fence. Unlike the present case, the outer fence did not have razor wire on 
top, did not surround the entire facility, and did not confine or secure the inmates. IcL 
The purpose of that outer fence in Urbauer was "not to keep inmates in, but to keep 
others out." Id at 1276. Under those circumstances, the court appropriately determined 
that Urbauer "was outside the confines of the correctional facility" when he was 
apprehended. Id. at 1275. By contrast, Germonto was still confined by the outer 
perimeter fence when he was apprehended. 
Moreover, as the state acknowledges, various other courts have held that a 
completed escape has not been committed when the inmate has not left prison 
boundaries. See S.B. at 9. For example, in People v. Lavaie. 82 Cal.Rptr. 2d 719 (Cal. 
App. 4th 1999), the court held that a completed escape does not occur when the inmate 
has entered a restricted area but has not left the boundaries of the prison. The court 
stated: . ; ;;-. 
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We have found no cases recognizing an escape when a prisoner remains 
within the camp or prison barriers, but is outside the particular area within 
the camp or prison where he is permitted to be. The evidence in this case, 
even when viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment establishes 
only that much, and is hence insufficient. 
Id at 723. State v. Buck, 724 S.W.2d 574. 576 (Mo. 1986), likewise held that an inmate 
must leave the boundaries of the prison to be guilty of escape. Id. ('The essence of 
escape by an inmate in custody is that the custodial detention be breached and the inmate 
be at liberty, however briefly."); see also State v. Gaines. 372 So.2d 552, 553-55 (La. 
1978) (inmate who did not leave prison boundaries did not leave confines of the prison). 
When interpreting a statute, f!court[s] will construe the statute to avoid 
interpretations that conflict with relevant constitutional mandates, so long as the resulting 
construction does not conflict with the reasonable or actual legislative purposes of the 
statute." State v. Mohi. 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah 1995) (Russon, J., dissenting and 
concurring). If Utah's escape statute were interpreted to allow a conviction for escape 
when an inmate has not left the prison confines, the statute would be unconstitutionally 
vague. "' Vagueness questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether 
the statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct.'" State v. Morrison. 2001 UT 73, 
1J13, 31 P.3d 547 (further citations omitted). A statute is therefore unconstitutionally 
vague "'if it is [not] sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is 
prohibited.5" Id (further citation omitted); see also State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 
926 (Utah App. 1991) (statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth 
7 
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Amendment due process protection where "it does not give notice of prohibited behavior 
with sufficient specificity"). Additionally, a statute is unconstitutionally vague when it 
leaves officers, judges and juries with discretion to decide what actions constitute the 
crime, thereby leading to arbitrary enforcement. See Grayned v. City of Rockford. 408 
U.S. 104, 108-09(1972). See also discussion in A.B. at 11-14. 
In State v. Gaines. 372 So.2d 552, 555 (La. 1979), the court held the phrase "[a]ny 
place where . . . legally confined" in Louisiana's escape statute "must be construed as a 
place where the individual is actually confined, i.e., restrained by physical barriers 
sufficient to prevent him from going at large." IdL. (further citations omitted). The court 
concluded that "[a]ny less definitive or more ambiguous definition of place of 
confinement would render the statute unconstitutionally vague." IcL The same holds true 
for Utah's statute. If the terms "leaves official custody" and "confinement" are 
broadened to include movement into restricted areas within the prison rather than limited 
to circumstances where the inmate leaves prison boundaries, Utah's escape statute fails to 
give a person of ordinary intelligence notice of which misbehavior within the prison 
might amount to an escape charge. See A.B. at 12-14. A person could not read the 
statute and know that he would be guilty of a completed escape even if he did not leave 
the confines of the prison. Moreover, prison guards, judges and juries would be given 
unlimited discretion to decide whether misbehavior within the prison was significant 
enough to be considered an escape. This would lead to arbitrary enforcement, in 
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violation of due process. See A.B. at 12-14. 
The state does not address the merits of Germonto's claim that the trial court's 
interpretation of the statute renders the escape statute unconstitutionally vague in 
violation of due process. Instead, the state argues Germonto "lacks standing to assert a 
vagueness challenge." S.B. at 10-11. The state is incorrect, however, because it is 
apparent that Germonto is adversely affected by the vague application of the escape 
statute and therefore has standing to raise this claim. See. State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 
1379 (Utah 1996). 
The state seems to argue that in order to have standing to claim that a statute is 
vague, a defendant must be completely innocent of any criminal wrongdoing. S.B. at 
10-12. The state misconstrues the test for standing, however.1 "[Sjtanding rules are a 
matter of state procedural law." Mace, 921 P.2d at 1379. Utah appellate decisions make 
it clear that in order to have standing to mount a constitutional challenge to a statute, the 
party must be "'adversely affected by that very statute.'" State v. Davis. 787 P.2d 517, 
524 (Utah App. 1990); see also Mace, 921 P.2d at 1379. 
The facts of this case demonstrate that Germonto is adversely affected by this 
statute and therefore has standing. Indeed, the adverse effect on Germonto is that he 
1 
1
 It is important to note that this case is before the Court on an appeal of the 
refusal to quash the bindover order and that the case has not yet gone to trial. If the 
conditional plea is vacated and the case remanded for trial on the charge of attempted 
escape, evidence may be presented controverting or clarifying the statement attributed to 
Germonto as well as the testimony that Germonto was on the outer perimeter fence. 
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stands convicted of a completed escape even though he never left the confines of the 
prison. This is precisely what Germonto complains of in his vagueness analysis; he 
therefore has standing to raise this claim. 
Moreover, Germonto is not asking this Court to strike the statute. Instead, 
Germonto is arguing that the escape statute must and can be interpreted to meet 
constitutional requirements, and that in order to interpret the statute in a constitutionally 
acceptable fashion, the statute cannot be read to define escape under these circumstances 
where Germonto did not leave the prison boundaries. Instead, the escape statute requires 
that an inmate leave the confines of the prison in order to commit a completed escape. 
CONCLUSION 
The plain language of Utah's escape statute requires that an inmate leave the 
confines of the state prison in order to commit a completed escape. Additionally, in 
order to meet vagueness concerns, Utah's escape statute must be read to require that an 
inmate leave the prison confines to be guilty of a completed escape. Accordingly, 
Defendant/Appellant Frederick Germonto respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
lower court ruling and remand this case to allow him to withdraw his conditional plea of 
guilty and proceed to trial on the charge of attempted escape. 
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